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Abstract  
Social theories of giving have often been shaped by anthropological accounts that 
present it as a form of pre-market reciprocal exchange, yet this exchangist discourse 
obscures important contemporary giving practices. This paper discusses two types of 
giving that confound the exchangist model: sharing practices within the family, and free 
gifts to strangers. Once we reject understandings of giving derived from analyses of 
non-modern economies, it becomes possible to see that the gift economy is not a rare 
survival but rather a central element of contemporary society and indeed the 
contemporary economy. The task for social theory is not to anachronise giving but to 
make sense of the variety and complexity of actual contemporary giving practices. This 
paper offers the categories of free and positional gifts as a contribution to this analysis. 
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The social theory of the gift is conducted in the shadow of Marcel Mauss. Mauss’s 
famous essay discusses societies in which the economy depends upon cycles of giving. 
“Gifts circulate” he tells us, “with the certainty that they will be reciprocated…” (Mauss 
2002 [1950]: 45). The implication, as Mary Douglas expresses it in her foreword to 
Mauss’s essay, “is that the whole idea of a free gift is based on a misunderstanding. 
There should not be any free gifts” (Douglas 2002: ix). But Douglas is wrong, at least 
when we cross the fault line that divides the anthropology of non-modern societies from 
the sociology of modern life. There are free gifts: gifts that are given with no obligation 
to reciprocate, and no expectation that they will be reciprocated. The denial of their 
existence has served to obscure and conceal a vitally important set of contemporary 
social practices.
1
 The purpose of this paper is to reinstate the unreciprocated gift, 
alongside reciprocal varieties, as a legitimate focus of sociological attention, to 
demonstrate that we need the concept of free gifts if we are to make sense of a range of 
important contemporary socio-economic practices and to identify some of the different 
types of unreciprocated giving practices. Free gifts, however, must be distinguished 
from the mythical pure gift, the idea of a gift that is completely unmotivated by any 
benefit to the giver and done without being influenced by any sort of normative 
pressure. There are no such gifts; but this does not entail that all gifts require 
reciprocation. 
For traditional economics, the concept of a gift economy is almost a contradiction in 
terms – the only part of the gift economy that fits within its view of the world is the ‘gift 
industry’ – the business of making commodities to be used as gifts after they have been 
purchased. But because it restricts its concept of the economy to those processes that are 
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governed by markets and excludes by definition those other parts of the substantive 
economy that do not involve commodity exchange, the gift economy proper is largely 
invisible to economics. What is perhaps more surprising is that sociology too has 
largely ignored giving. Although there are some honourable exceptions (for example 
Bourdieu 1977; Cheal 1988; Godbout and Caillé 1998; Komter 2005), even these have 
mostly taken their lead from anthropology and in particular from Mauss’s iconic essay.  
Mauss, despite formulating his classic work as a critique of utilitarianism and the 
discourse of the market, continues to express the idea of the gift as a form of exchange.
2
 
Mauss clearly has no intention of endorsing utilitarian thinking,  yet he employs a 
discursive form redolent of the very economistic discourse he seeks to question: 
although he distinguishes gift exchange from market exchange, the very concept of 
exchange nevertheless implies that two parties undertake a transaction with a view to 
what they will receive from the other (Silber 1998: 145). One unfortunate consequence 
has been to encourage a view of the gift that both misrepresents and radically 
underrepresents its social significance in contemporary societies. Although some gifts 
do conform to the logic of exchange, many others do not, including the most common 
and most contemporary forms of giving.
3
 Once we include these forms, giving 
constitutes a vast but persistently ignored sector of the contemporary substantive 
economy. 
This paper seeks to redress the neglect of giving by identifying varieties that do not 
take the form of exchange. It proceeds by identifying different categories of giving, then 
focuses in on two categories in particular that are radically inconsistent with exchangist 
accounts of the gift: positional giving, which is examined through the case of giving in 
families and similar intimate relationships, and free gifts to strangers, illustrated in 
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particular by new forms of giving on the Internet. First, however, the paper examines 
the intellectual context that contributes to the neglect of kinds of giving that do not 
conform to the model of exchange.    
Exchangism and the gift 
In the dominant economic discourse the market pervades and utterly saturates 
economic space: the economy, for it, is nothing more nor less than the market, and 
production that is done for exchange in the market. Sociologists are largely united in 
their rejection of this discourse, guided for example by Polanyi’s work on alternative 
forms of integration, embeddedness, and the distinction between the substantive and 
formal economies (Polanyi 2001 [1957]). But until recently sociology has tended to 
neglect important areas of the substantive economy beyond the market, in particular 
substantial elements of the gift economy. It has done so, this paper suggests, partly 
because both anthropologists and sociologists have tended to look beyond the market 
without looking beyond exchange. This critique, in other words, is itself still embedded 
in the very forms of discourse it seeks to reject. 
In the work of Mauss, for example, the gift appears as part of a ‘gift economy’ that is 
still an exchange economy. As Mary Douglas says in her interpretation of Mauss’s 
argument, “right across the globe and as far back as we can go in the history of human 
civilization, the major transfer of goods has been by cycles of obligatory returns of 
gifts” (Douglas 2002:x). Mauss himself writes that the subject of his book is societies in 
which “exchanges and contracts take place in the form of presents; in theory these are 
voluntary, in reality they are given and reciprocated obligatorily” (Mauss 2002 [1950]: 
3). “Gifts circulate” he tells us, “with the certainty that they will be reciprocated…” 
(Mauss 2002 [1950]: 45). For Mauss, the gift economy is a system that is characterised 
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above all by reciprocity: the idea that every gift is to be followed by an equivalent 
counter-gift. Giving, in this model, is essentially a form of deferred exchange.
4
 It is, of 
course, a different form of exchange than market exchange, yet it remains a form of 
exchange. Thus even Mauss’s model includes an element of the dominant discourse, an 
element that we may call exchangism: the tendency to treat all transfers of goods as 
requiring reciprocation, and all production as done for the purpose of exchange 
(Pyyhtinen 2014: chapter 2). As Graeber argues in his discussion of the anthropological 
literature on gifts: 
almost all this literature concentrates on the exchange of gifts, assuming that 
whenever one gives a gift, this act incurs a debt, and the recipient must 
eventually reciprocate in kind… [T]he logic of the marketplace has insinuated 
itself even into the thinking of those who are most explicitly opposed to it 
(Graeber 2011: 90) 
This paper does not address the question of whether giving necessarily takes a 
reciprocal form in non-modern societies, but exchangism must be rejected when we 
seek to understand the many forms of the gift in modern society. Many of these gifts are 
not exchanges because no return from the recipient is required or expected.  
Nor is this a problem that is confined to anthropology: often sociologists also see 
giving as a process of reciprocity and exchange. Komter, for example, tells us that “The 
principle of reciprocity underlying gift exchange proved to be the fundament of human 
society” (Komter 2005: 195) (cf. Berking 1999: 26). As Godbout says, there are many 
ways of thinking about the gift that “give in, subtly, to the temptation of seeing the gift 
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as a kind of economic exchange” but instead we  must “remove it from the shadow cast 
by modern economics” (Godbout and Caillé 1998: 130).  
Exchangism has a tendency to be self-confirming. Consider the following: 
Within the system of the gift, ‘to reciprocate’ means, in fact, to give. The 
distinction between giving and receiving is one of analysis alone… We give, and 
if analysis shows that we have already received, the label ‘reciprocation’ is 
affixed to this part of the act (Godbout and Caillé 1998: 95) 
Godbout’s point, as I understand it, is that for an analyst with an exchangist 
mentality, any return following a gift becomes a reciprocation and thus a confirmation 
of the exchangist view, irrespective of whether it appears this way to the participants 
(Berking 1999: 40). For such analysts, the return of a further gift at a later point is the 
completion of an exchange, in a system that requires such completions. But this is not 
necessarily the spirit of the ‘return’ at all (even in those cases when a return actually 
does occur) (Godbout 2000: 41). It may merely be, for example, that when two people 
are in a certain sort of relationship, they give each other gifts. It is at least as plausible to 
argue that the significant feature of giving in many contemporary Western societies is 
that one partner should not generally give two successive gifts, since this may 
unbalance the relationship to one of unequal prestige and dependency. Given such a 
standard, gifts may alternate, but this is not a matter of exchange, it is a matter of both 
parties making their contribution to sustaining the relationship (Godbout and Caillé 
1998: 7). Concepts of gift exchange, equivalence, and reciprocity may be attached by 
the observer, but not necessarily by the participant.  
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Bourdieu has finessed this distinction, seeking to recognise both the subjective denial 
of reciprocity and the objective fact of it, but positions the subjective denial in much of 
his work largely as a misrecognition of the truth of reciprocity (and thus as an error: see 
Osteen 2002a: 24),
5
 a misrecognition that plays an important functional part in the 
process of gift exchange (Bourdieu 1977: 4-6). While this is no doubt true of types of 
giving that do resemble the exchange model, Bourdieu tends to write as if it applies to 
gift-giving in general, and thus he too falls prey to the exchangist illusion that all giving 
is a form of exchange.  
Derrida, too, finds a conflict between the absence of reciprocity in the concept of the 
gift and its presence in the practice of the gift as he understands it (Derrida 1997). 
While Bourdieu focuses on how this apparent contradiction is carried off in practice, 
Derrida characteristically turns it into a paradox. Again, however, the problem, and thus 
the paradox, arises only for gifts where reciprocation is indeed present. Like Mauss and 
Bourdieu, Derrida’s argument is premised on the universality of reciprocity in giving. 
Unlike them, however, he extends reciprocity radically by suggesting that it is present 
even in the simple recognition that a gift has occurred (Derrida 1997: 129).  
It is tempting to suggest that he found this extension necessary in order to preserve 
the paradox in cases where a material return does not occur. More charitably, however, 
one might suggest that Derrida has put his finger on a problem that must be addressed 
by anyone claiming the existence of free gifts: even when a material return to the giver 
does not occur, is there not usually (or always) a symbolic return? The best response, I 
suggest, is to recognise that giving practices are normatively governed, and it is the 
normative environment, which differs between different giving practices, which 
determines both whether reciprocation is expected and also what counts as 
 Page 8 
reciprocation. In neither the practices of free giving discussed in this paper nor the 
practices of reciprocal giving documented by Mauss does symbolic recognition count as 
reciprocation of a gift. In both the potlatch and the kula ring, real material goods are 
required as reciprocation. Derrida’s argument, in this context, is simply one more case 
of the exchangist determination to find ways of reading reciprocity into the gift.  
Still, one should not entirely dismiss the relevance of symbolic returns. Thanks may 
be normatively expected in cases of giving where material reciprocation is not, and such 
cases are perhaps intermediate between reciprocal giving and the most clear-cut cases of 
free giving. But even symbolic returns are not always required: the recipients of 
anonymous digital gifts such as filesharing downloads, for example, rarely acknowledge 
them, and symbolic returns may even be barred institutionally: it is usually impossible 
to thank the blood donors from whose gifts we benefit. 
Marginalising the gift 
One of the most significant consequences of seeing giving as a pre-market form of 
exchange is the implication that giving in the contemporary economy is a marginal 
residual, a survival of secondary importance to the market system of exchange that is 
taken to have replaced it. This perspective is very clear in Mauss’s unilinear social 
evolutionism, in which gift exchange is seen as “a regime that must have been shared by 
a very large part of humanity during a very long transitional phase” prior to the rise of 
money and the market (Mauss 2002 [1950]: 59).
6
 This is also the implication, for 
example, of Polanyi’s typology of forms of integration. For Caillé, “the idea of the gift 
as a mode of exchange offers an almost irresistible temptation to scholars to propose 
that there is a radical break between premodern and modern cultures, with the gift 
reserved for the premoderns, while we must deal through the market and the state” 
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(Preface to Godbout and Caillé 1998: vii). Cheal rightly sees this tendency to think of 
gift practices as “archaic customs” as a “major barrier to the development of a sociology 
of gift practices” (1988: 2). Ironically, however, Cheal himself displays one symptom of 
the mindset that sees modern gifts as residual forms of reciprocity: he sees gifts purely 
in terms of formal presents, given mostly on ritual occasions such as birthdays and 
religious festivals (as does Berking 1999) (Adloff and Mau 2006: 96). 
This exchangist tradition overlooks a vast range of giving that does not take the 
reciprocal form, and thus a vast range of substantive economic activity that occurs 
beneath the radar of an economics that is oriented to exchange rather than to the 
provisioning of human needs.
7
 This includes, perhaps most significantly, work that is 
done for members of one’s family and one’s friends: growing and preparing food, 
providing transport, caring work, or providing shelter and clothing – whether through 
one’s own work (e.g. cooking, knitting, subsistence agriculture) or through giving goods 
purchased in the market. But it also includes, for example, free and open source 
software, the creation of user generated digital media content, and volunteering.  
It is difficult to estimate the scale of such activity in quantitative terms as by 
definition it is not measured by the standard we have come to take for granted: 
exchange value. But we can start to understand the potential scale by stitching together 
scraps of evidence from a variety of sources. Godbout, for example, tells us that in 
North America 70-80% of care for the aged is provided by the family (Godbout and 
Caillé 1998: 26). In 2008, the Linux Foundation estimated that it would cost $10.8 
billion to build the software in a typical distribution of the open source operating system 
Linux if it was developed commercially (Linux is one of the most successful open 
source software products but there are many others). Anderson’s “back-of-the-
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envelope” calculation of the unpaid effort expended on building free to view web pages 
suggests that if it was paid at a modest rate it might cost $260 billion a year (Anderson 
2009: 168). And all this merely scratches the surface of contemporary giving. It seems 
likely that the majority of the world’s population devotes more of its time to unpaid 
productive labour for the benefit of those close to them than to paid work (Ironmonger 
1996). If this is so, and if we can consider such labour as a gift, the contemporary gift 
economy remains larger than the market economy, on some measures at least.
8
  
A perspective that ignores this economy not only ignores a substantial amount of 
economic activity. It also radically understates the role of normativity and of 
motivations other than rationally calculative self interest in driving economic behaviour, 
and it obscures a vast non-capitalist economy that exists alongside the politically 
dominant economic form (Elder-Vass 2014b). 
Kinds of giving 
While others have rejected the exchangist assumption, there is a temptation to replace 
the concept of the gift as a form of exchange with some other universal concept of the 
gift. There is a suggestion of such a strategy, for example, when Osteen writes “to 
discover the true nature of the gift, we must redirect our gaze from reciprocity toward 
other principles and motives. When we do, a different set of norms emerges, a set 
founded upon spontaneity rather than calculation, upon risk instead of reciprocity, upon 
altruism instead of autonomy” (Osteen 2002b: 7). This paper is founded on the view 
that it is more productive and enlightening to take a different perspective: that the gift 
may take many different forms with different implications. We can recognise that some 
giving is founded on reciprocity while rejecting the argument that all giving must be, 
and go on to identify alternative forms with different implications. 
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We may classify types of giving along many different dimensions, but this paper will 
focus on just two (see Table 1 and Figure 1 below). First we may classify them on the 
basis of what, if anything, is expected of the recipient as a consequence of accepting the 
gift. Giving may be distinguished from market exchange because, unlike market 
exchange, it is a voluntary transfer of goods or services that does not entail an 
immediate return of agreed benefits of equivalent value that brings the relationship 
between seller and buyer to a point of balance (and thus potentially to a point of closure: 
Graeber 2011: 104).
 9
 As we have seen, however, classical treatments of giving such as 
Mauss’s have nevertheless considered it as, in effect, a delayed form of exchange, in 
which the recipient is expected to return a gift of approximately equivalent or greater 
value after a period of delay. There is considerable evidence that some giving takes this 
form, and we may adopt the terminology of the literature and name this reciprocal 
giving. 
However, there are also many cases of what I will call free giving, in which it is 
considered perfectly acceptable if the recipient neither returns an equivalent gift to the 
donor nor makes similar gifts in a cyclical pattern. Charitable donations are a clear case, 
and the most interesting contemporary developments in gifting also seem to be 
concentrated in this space, developments such as the free and open source software 
movement and the gifting of intellectual work to projects like Wikipedia. Of course, 
some recipients of such gifts may go on to reciprocate directly or to give cyclically 
themselves, but the issue here is not whether this occurs, but rather whether it is 
normatively required of the original recipients as a consequence of receiving the 
original gift, and in free giving this is not the case.  
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In a second dimension, we may also distinguish between types of giving in terms of 
the expectations placed upon donors: is there, or is there not, a normative pressure to 
give in the first place, and if so what form does it take? In some cases, I suggest, there is 
no such pressure, but in others there is, and the case I wish to examine is what we may 
call positional giving. In positional giving there is a normative expectation that people 
in certain social positions will give gifts to certain other people. There is no necessary 
expectation incumbent on the recipient to make a return to the original donor but on the 
other hand they too, like anyone else, will be expected to make similar gifts if and when 
they find themselves in the equivalent social position. Although the experience of 
receiving such gifts no doubt helps to socialise their recipients into the norms 
concerned, the social expectation that they will follow this norm is not derived from the 
initial act of gift giving itself, but pre-exists it (on normative pressures see Elder-Vass 
2010: chapter 6; Elder-Vass 2012: chapters 2 and 3).
 
The central cases here occur in the 
family: in particular, there is an expectation that parents will give to their children, and 
that those children will not return those gifts but rather will make similar gifts of their 
own if they become parents themselves. All children depend upon giving from their 
parents or carers until they are able to contribute more than the cost of their upkeep to 
the family’s consumption needs. While in some societies there may be a reciprocal 
obligation to care for the parents in their old age (a rather uncertain one given the 
timescales involved), the more taxing obligation is usually for children to sustain their 
own offspring later in the lifecycle. This is not a cycle of reciprocity but a “serial flow” 
(Cheal 1988: 58). 
Some thinkers have nevertheless sought to represent such obligations as a form of 
reciprocity: Sahlins called it “generalized reciprocity” (1974) and Mauss “alternating 
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reciprocity” (2007 [1967]: 103). But this makes reciprocity into a term of art that 
departs substantially from common usage, in which reciprocity entails a return from B 
to A in response to some gift, favour, or interaction that has flowed from A to B. In 
cases of “generalized” reciprocity, not only is the ‘return’ made to a different person, 
but the ‘return’ is a type of gift that we are expected to make irrespective of whether we 
ever receive an equivalent gift: in other words, it is not a return at all. As Graeber points 
out, this labelling strategy merely “demonstrates that if one has already decided that all 
relations are based on reciprocity, one can always define the term so broadly as to make 
it true” (Graeber 2011: 405).  
Type of gift Expectations Examples (culturally specific) 
Reciprocal The recipient should provide a 
return gift to the giver at some 
future time 
Birthday presents between friends; 
labour contributed to neighbours’ 
building projects 
Positional Anyone in the relevant position 
and circumstances should give 
such gifts 
Feeding and clothing one’s 
children 
Free No expectation of a return gift or 
obligation to make similar gifts 
Most gifts to charity; contributing 
to open source software projects 
Table 1: Three types of gifts 
A gift, then, may be reciprocal or free, and it may also be positional or non-positional. 
These are two different dimensions of difference, and may be represented graphically, 
as in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1: Two dimensions of giving 
Thus some positional gifts are also free gifts, for example the sharing of scientific 
knowledge by those who have developed it. As Merton makes clear in his analysis of 
the normative system of modern science, scientists are expected to share their results 
freely with others through the mechanism of academic publishing: this is positional 
giving  (Merton 1973). They do not expect to receive reciprocal value from each and 
every reader of their work, nor is there any obligation on those readers to make 
equivalent gifts to others – unless, of course, they too are academic scientists. Hence 
these are also free gifts. Free riders, in utter contrast to exchange theory, are welcome. 
Other positional gifts, however, may require reciprocation. The North American 
potlatch described by Mauss is a kind of ritual feast, at which the host also gives away 
or even destroys a variety of material goods. There is a positional expectation that “A 
chief must give potlatches for himself, his son, his son-in-law, or his daughter, and for 
his dead” (Mauss 2002 [1950]: 50) hence these are positional gifts – only chiefs give 
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them – but there is also an expectation that “the potlatch must be reciprocated with 
interest” (Mauss 2002 [1950]: 53). Reciprocation takes varying forms of which two are 
notable: the individual who receives, for example, a blanket, must return blankets on 
some future occasion, but other chiefs who attend the potlatch must give potlatches of 
their own. Even the form of reciprocation, then, is positional.
10
 
Whatever the expectations placed upon the recipient of a gift may be, donors always 
have reasons for giving, reasons that typically involve receiving some benefit, whether 
from the recipient, from others, or internally as a product of the act of giving itself 
(Godbout and Caillé 1998: 93-4; Komter 2005: 46-50). However, I immediately reject 
two connotations that exchangist thinkers might be tempted to impute to this statement. 
First, this by no means implies that all giving is an act of exchange after all. If for 
example a charitable donor makes a gift that has life changing benefits for many people, 
she may achieve admiration and prestige in the eyes of other people as a result, but this 
is not an exchange: it is not an immediate return; it is not on the whole a return from the 
recipients themselves; it is not a return of an agreed benefit; and only by accident might 
it represent an equivalent value. Second, it does not imply that acts of giving are 
selfishly motivated. There is nothing selfish in an act of giving, for example, that is 
motivated by pleasure in other people’s happiness (Godbout and Caillé 1998: 184). This 
question of altruism in giving is discussed in more detail later in the paper. 
The remainder of the paper considers two types of non-reciprocal giving in a little 
more depth: sharing within the household, and free gifts to strangers. 
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Sharing/caring within intimate relationships 
Caring is so taken for granted that we may not even think of it as giving. It may seem 
odd, for example, to say that parents are giving to their children when we are talking 
about the meals, shelter, clothing, and other facilities that they share with them. One 
reason for our sense of doubt may be that within the context of the family and similar 
intimate relationships we may not think of the goods involved as things that belong to 
one particular person but rather as things that belong to the household as a whole and 
thus are shared rather than given (Godbout and Caillé 1998: 29). The institution of 
property, in a sense, ends at the front door, and if giving is a matter of transferring 
ownership rights it only has meaning within the institution of property. 
We might dispute this on the grounds that the law sees property rights everywhere, or 
on the grounds that ownership practices do continue within the family – particular 
pieces of clothing, or food, or books, or electronic gadgets, for example, might be 
regarded as belonging to one particular member of the family, irrespective of legal 
property rights. But perhaps the most fruitful way to dispute it would be to recognise 
that typically children are unable to provide these things for themselves and hence they 
only obtain them as a result of their parents or carers bringing them into the household. 
In this sense, at least, sharing is a kind of giving, a transfer of what is obtained outside 
the household into the sharing economy of the family. But there is also another variety 
of sharing, which is what we might call giving of oneself: doing work for the benefit of 
others in the household, whether directly caring work, housework, or, particularly in the 
case of children, teaching and mentoring.  
Sharing, then, may be defined as a kind of giving in which goods and labour are 
provided by one member of an interactional group for the benefit of others within the 
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group, without any expectation of reciprocal material return, and it is therefore a variety 
of free giving. The paradigmatic cases of sharing occur in the family-based household: 
caring for children and caring for aged or infirm relatives, and these are also cases of 
positional giving since they are normatively expected of those in loco parentis (there is 
also, of course, a gendered element to this positionality). Positional giving to children 
who are too young to fend for themselves is about as close as we will find to a universal 
human social practice, although clearly the form and the duration of it vary considerably 
(Godbout and Caillé 1998: 24). Indeed, parental generosity (free positional giving) often 
continues towards adult children (Cheal 1988: 8; Heath and Calvert 2013).  
Caring for the aged is arguably more contested, particularly in societies where the 
issue is complicated by extended lifespans and the commercialisation of elder care, but 
even in North America, as noted earlier, 70-80% of care for the aged has been provided 
by the family (Godbout and Caillé 1998: 26). The structure of family obligations is also 
rather variable between cultures, and this may affect how we should classify the gifts 
concerned. In cultures where there is a strong normative expectation that any surviving 
children will care for their parents in their old age, we may consider that their original 
gift of childcare was a kind of positional reciprocal giving, with the required 
reciprocation taking the form of elder care. In cultures where children are not expected 
to care for their parents (even if some do), the original gift of childcare would be free 
positional giving. Recognising both cases also creates the need to recognise that there 
are many shades of intermediate variation, and thus that gifts may lie along a continuum 
between the fully free and the strongly reciprocal, rather than dividing unambiguously 
into binary categories. 
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Sharing is perhaps done primarily for love, out of concern and care for those with 
whom we feel close emotional bonds. Daniel Miller’s ethnographic work on shopping 
in North London argues, for example, that “shopping is primarily an act of love”, in that 
most shopping is directed at meeting the needs of other family members, as part of a 
process of constituting “relationships of love and care” with other members of the 
household (Miller 1998: 18). Other factors, notably relationship building and normative 
pressures, may also be significant, though Miller argues that “Love as a practice is quite 
compatible with feelings of obligation and responsibility” (Miller 1998: 19). 
Yet the family household is also the site of powerful normative systems – primarily 
gender structures – that may make such giving more or less compulsory for certain 
groups of people. Clearly some domestic labour is forced rather than given voluntarily, 
but not all. The most plausible way to understand the contemporary Western household 
is as the site of a mixed economy of practices (Elder-Vass 2014b). Whatever other 
practices may sometimes be present, some of the transfers of goods and services made 
to partners and many or most of those made to children and dependent elders are gifts.  
In the longer term the recipients of child care may in turn give care to their former 
carers when they become old and infirm. They may do so from love, or they may do so 
out of a sense of obligation, or some mixture of the two. Such a sense of obligation may 
arise from social norms: there may be a norm, for example, that children (or more 
specifically, in some cultures at least, daughters) should care for their parents when they 
become old. Or it may come from a sense that it is only fair, having been cared for 
oneself by this person, that one should care for them when they themselves need it. 
There is, then, an element of reciprocation in the return gift, but again this is very 
different from the model of gift-as-exchange. Typically the return gift occurs many 
 Page 19 
decades after the original gift; there is no calculation of equivalence of the size of the 
return gift vis-à-vis the size of the original gift; and at the time of the original gift it is 
more or less impossible to calculate whether there might be any such return: for 
example either party might fail to live long enough, the relationship may break down, or 
the parent may be fit and well enough in old age that they do not need significant care. 
While in some cultures it may be possible to see elder care as a reciprocal gift that is 
normatively expected, in many cases these uncertainties make it difficult to see child 
care as a gift that is made in the expectation of reciprocation. These are only tenuously 
connected gifts. 
Sharing within the household is ignored by exchangist theory, but it is enormously 
important. No doubt one could estimate its scale by examining the time that is devoted 
to caring within the family, and the portion of income that is devoted to shared 
consumption. But that would still underestimate its significance: this is a kind of giving 
without which the human species as we know it would not exist. 
Free gifts to strangers 
It is not only positional giving, however, that refuses to conform to the exchangist 
model of giving as reciprocity. This section considers what has sometimes been 
regarded as the uniquely modern form of giving, identified by Titmuss in his book on 
blood donation as giving to strangers (1997: 226). While there may be some gentle 
normative encouragement in some countries to give blood, there is no obligation to do 
so,
11
 nor is there any significant material return in countries that rely on donations for 
blood supplies, indeed it may be positively inconvenient and disruptive to give blood. In 
these giving practices the donor offers gifts to unknown or distant others with no hope 
or expectation of material return. These, then, are free gifts, and they provide us with 
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the clearest possible contradiction of Douglas’s argument that such gifts should not 
occur.  
Perhaps the most obvious group of such practices is charitable giving, whether of 
money or of labour (volunteering). Charitable donors do not expect a material return 
from the recipients of their gifts nor do they expect charity from others at some future 
point. Charitable giving is often wrapped in institutional structures that serve, among 
other things, to distance the gifts involved from the idea of  reciprocity. Thus, for 
example, the Jewish charitable practice tzedekah is constructed as “a double-blind 
procedure – givers are not supposed to know to whom they are giving and the receivers 
should not know their benefactors” (Lainer-Vos 2013: 179). Hence reciprocity is ruled 
out institutionally. Contemporary charitable organisations perform a similar function; 
indeed there may be several layers of organisation separating the initial donor from the 
eventual recipient (Barman 2007). By eliminating not only reciprocation itself but also 
any sense that reciprocation might be required, such institutions also ease or eliminate 
the status degradation incurred in systems of reciprocal giving by those who are unable 
to reciprocate (Mauss 2002 [1950]: 83). The sense that the unreciprocated gift signals 
inferiority and dishonour is a product of specific giving practices, and not of giving as 
such (as we shall see again in connection with digital gifts). One of the most interesting 
features of recent writing on giving has been the increasing recognition that 
organisations actively manage these meanings with the intention of encouraging giving 
(e.g. Healy 2006; Lainer-Vos 2013); as a result they have arguably helped to construct 
less socially onerous practices for the receipt of gifts.
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Also within this cluster, however, we find what is arguably the most dynamic set of 
giving practices in the contemporary period: what we may call digital giving. When, for 
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example, people write or improve articles on Wikipedia, when they contribute to the 
development of free open source software, or when they post advice on web forums, 
they create digital goods and give them away freely to anyone who cares to look them 
up on the Internet. This is not charity: there is no sense that those strangers to whom we 
give digital gifts are necessarily worse off than ourselves, and there is no stigma 
associated with accepting such gifts. When we give such digital gifts we are giving to 
strangers as equals, but also without expectation of reciprocation. Again, there is no 
sense of dishonour arising from failure to reciprocate such gifts. 
Digital giving is giving without sacrifice: when we give a digital product we give 
without giving up, without losing the thing that we are giving away. Digital goods are, 
to put the point more technically, nonrival. To some extent this was true already for 
scientific knowledge, and indeed this too is now a digital product, but before the 
Internet, giving away copies of scientific knowledge was not a cost-free activity: paper 
had to be produced and distributed, introducing costs into the process, the need for a 
funding model to finance those costs, and thus the intrusion of commercial activities 
that monetised the distribution of such knowledge. The Internet has transformed this 
situation, and the marginal cost of distributing copies of digital goods has fallen so close 
to zero that it is often effectively free. This transforms the economics of information 
economies. For example, free riders are now much less of an issue. If a million people 
consume a digital product and only a tiny fraction of them contribute to its further 
development this may be enough to sustain a vibrant information economy. 
Communities generating information goods can survive when only a small proportion of 
members contribute, and those few that do can have the satisfaction of knowing that 
their work has helped an enormous number of other people.  
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In economies of scarcity, we give up what we give, and there is therefore a limit to 
how much we can give. We must therefore limit our giving, and ensure that our gifts 
reap rewards – whether in terms of reciprocity, social relationships, a sense of 
satisfaction in caring for our family, or standing in the community – that justify the 
personal costs of giving. In economies of abundance, like the digital information 
economy, there is no longer a need for every receipt of a gift to generate a benefit for 
the giver, as long as a few of them generate enough benefit in total for the practice to be 
sustainable. Reciprocity, at the level of the individual recipient, is essentially obsolete in 
such economies, and the meanings of giving practices have developed accordingly. In 
the case of the digital economy, I suggest, it is not organisations but our recognition of 
abundance, of the trivial marginal cost of the digital gift, that has eliminated any sense 
of dishonour in accepting it without reciprocation. 
Free gifts need not be disinterested gifts 
Why do people make digital gifts? Let us consider just one of the examples given 
above: the contributions that many people make to improving articles on Wikipedia. 
Clay Shirky provides a fascinating account of his own reasons (as far as he can tell by 
introspection) for making his first Wikipedia edit. These include, notably, the sheer 
pleasure of exercising our creative powers and the desire to do something for the benefit 
of humanity at large (Shirky 2009: 132-3). O’Sullivan suggests that although these 
motivations may indeed be significant, for many contributors to Wikipedia there are 
also others that Shirky misses, notably  
the attractions of belonging to a community, and of being recognized and 
valued by that community, especially one which offers a non-hierarchical and 
collaborative form of organization. Membership gives participants a sense of 
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belonging, a common purpose, and offers mutual support in achieving the aims 
of the group (O'Sullivan 2009: 87).  
These givers, in other words, are motivated by the desire to build social relationships 
and symbolic capital. There is not one exclusive motivation for contributing to 
Wikipedia and projects like it, but a range of motivations, and different contributors 
may be driven by different mixes of them. 
Wikipedia is unusual (and important) in being organised in a way that makes it 
difficult to use it to pursue more self-interested goals. But elsewhere in the digital 
economy we find complex entanglements between giving and the commodity economy. 
Those who contribute to the development of open source software, for example, 
sometimes see this work as a way of establishing a reputation that will later help them 
to find paid work – what Lerner and Tirole call the career concern incentive (Lerner 
and Tirole 2002: 213). Indeed some commercial companies fund the development of 
open source software and make a profit from related business (Weber 2004: 195-207), 
and this is only one of the many ways in which commercial companies hope to make 
money indirectly by offering gifts over the Internet (Elder-Vass 2014a). Google, for 
example, has become so profitable that in mid-2014 it was the third most highly valued 
company in the world, almost entirely on the basis of advertising revenues that it can 
earn because it gives away search results, email services, maps, and a vast range of 
other services as digital gifts. There is, as Fuchs puts it, “an entanglement of gifts within 
the commodity form” (Fuchs 2008: 171-2). And this is not only a digital phenomenon. 
Bird-David and Darr, for example, have documented the use of gifts in the sales process 
in Israeli retail shops, and McClain and Mears have examined the use of gifts to attract 
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models to U.S. nightclubs in order to also attract paying customers (Bird-David and 
Darr 2009; McClain and Mears 2012). 
There is some ambiguity about the role of reciprocation in some of these gifts, and 
indeed some of them verge on barter and thus commodity exchange. Google, for 
example, originally supplied free search results without appearing to receive anything in 
return, but subsequently found ways to monetise search by using the search terms 
entered by users to leverage the sale of advertising. We might say that when they did so 
their search was transformed from a gift to a form of barter, in which search was given 
in exchange for exploitable information about the user’s interests. The most productive 
way of understanding such cases, as Dan Lainer-Vos argues, is as grey areas, where 
these different forms of transaction blur into each other, and indeed where the same 
transaction may be understood differently by different parties (Lainer-Vos 2013: 23). 
Another such grey area is the case of loans that are given partly from a desire to support 
the recipient. Both Lainer-Vos, in discussing loans by members of the Irish and Israeli 
diasporas to the governments (or aspiring governments) of their respective homelands, 
and Heath and Calvert, in discussing loans from parents to adult children, have 
suggested that such loans may also have an element of gift, and indeed a gift where the 
potential for reciprocation was quite deliberately left uncertain (Heath and Calvert 2013; 
Lainer-Vos 2013). 
Giving, then, is the site of a vast range of differing motives and meanings, which 
cross-cut the varying forms of giving diversely. At one extreme, we have motives of 
generosity, which may be described as altruism when the gift is given out of a concern 
for the benefit of others. Godbout approaches this issue through the concept of 
disinterestedness. The disinterested gift is the gift that “expects nothing in return” 
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(Godbout and Caillé 1998: 176). It may gratify the giver simply through the pleasure 
she receives from giving; it may even turn out to be reciprocated, but for the giver “the 
act is entirely satisfying in itself and requires no return on the part of the donor” 
(Godbout and Caillé 1998: 184). Thus we may find generosity and altruism in the 
reciprocated gift as well as in the free gift. And we need not insist that altruism is so 
pure that the giver receives no pleasure from their generosity: a gift that is done out of 
an intention to benefit the recipient does not cease to be generous when giving is a 
pleasure. 
Equally, we may find that more selfish motives lie behind both reciprocal gifts and 
free gifts. Mauss, for example, reads the potlatch custom practiced by certain groups of 
Native Americans as driven by the desire to achieve status at the expense of others, 
particularly by giving so much that they are unable to reciprocate (Mauss 2002 [1950]: 
50-54). And free gifts may be equally selfishly motivated, such as the coding donated to 
open source projects by software companies who hope to earn consultancy and technical 
support fees on the back of the reputation they acquire from their gifts (Elder-Vass 
2014a). 
We will never make sense of the motives for giving, however, if we insist on dividing 
gifts into the altruistic gift and the selfish gift. Just as Clay Shirky was driven by a 
mixture of motives in making his first Wikipedia edit, all human actions are multiply 
determined by a variety of interacting causes, some of them operating as mental 
properties that motivate their actions (Elder-Vass 2007). One consequence is that there 
may be both altruistic and self-interested reasons that interact to produce acts of giving. 
The simplest case is the one we have already encountered, the giver who enjoys doing 
things for the benefit of others, but there are also others. 
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Nor need we locate the sources of giving purely at the individualistic level. Altruism, 
and indeed other kinds of motives, are encouraged or inhibited by a variety of social 
factors. One of the significant contributions of recent economic sociology to our 
understanding of giving has been the recognition that altruism is in part produced by the 
discursive and organisational strategies of various agencies. Kieran Healy shows this 
particularly clearly in his analysis of why blood and organ donation rates vary between 
territories, but we can find similar messages in, for example, the work of Emily Barman 
on charitable giving and that of Dan Lainer-Vos on diasporic giving (Barman 2007; 
Healy 2006; Lainer-Vos 2013). All giving is embedded in a context of institutions and 
relationships that affects both how and when it occurs, and also how it is understood. 
Conclusion 
Despite the exchangist paradigm that has dominated anthropological and sociological 
thinking about gifts, a vast amount of giving is not exchange, not even deferred and 
uncertain exchange. Even more important, giving is not all the same: there are many 
different kinds of giving, with radically different social and political implications. 
Positional giving, for example, which is free in the sense that no return is expected from 
the recipient to the initial donor, is fundamental to family life. Free gifts to strangers 
have become a widespread phenomenon on the Internet and one that has generated 
conflict over the appropriate form of the digital economy. 
These implications are significant. The gift economy ceases to be a marginal survival 
from a non-modern form of life and instead must be recognised as a central element of 
the contemporary economy. This in turn implies that capitalism, despite its more-or-less 
global extensive reach, remains much less than the total form of the contemporary 
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economy. Alongside it, and interpenetrating it, there remains a form of economy that 
still has space for tradition, generosity, creativity and unalienated labour.  
Yet we must avoid romanticising the gift economy. First, the gift is not a purely 
progressive phenomenon. Some forms of it are arguably disguised forms of exchange; 
some giving is used to sustain positions of social power; and some forms of it exist on 
the back of repressive systems of power such as the patriarchy that tends to compel 
women to be caregivers. Second, the gift itself is not immune to being coopted by the 
commodity economy: much of the giving in the digital economy in particular is 
thoroughly entangled with the sale of commodities (Fuchs 2008: 171, 185). Third, there 
are continuing struggles over the viability of many forms of giving, such as the many 
attempts by the media industry to prevent gifts of copyrighted material, and it is an open 
question how these struggles will turn out (Gillespie 2007; Goldsmith and Wu 2006: 
chapter 7; Strangelove 2005: chapter 1).  
The contemporary gift economy may be as large as, or larger than, the market 
economy. It is perhaps to be expected that economists, with their market-centred 
doctrine, generally ignore it. And the central political roles of market power and market 
discourse in the contemporary world certainly justify considerable attention to the 
market from sociologists. But it would be disappointing if social theorists also 
continued to accept the exchangist assumptions that have led them to treat the gift 
economy as marginal. Giving, in all its forms, should be a major focus for sociology 
and social theory.  
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Notes 
 
                                                 
1
 Although Mirowski has already criticised Douglas’s claim that there are no free gifts as “bizarre”, he 
continues to talk of gifts as exchanges, thus contributing to the concealment criticised here (Mirowski 
2001: 439). Testart gets much closer to my argument: he has described the idea of a universal obligation 
to reciprocate as “manifestly false” because “we know of gift giving practices... from which this 
obligation is absent”: such practices are the focus of this paper (Testart 1998: 98). 
2
 This is arguably one aspect of what Mirowski calls the “radical undecidability” of Mauss’s work: the 
tensions between different arguments that remain unreconciled in it (Mirowski 2001: 440). 
3
 In sociology, Jacques Godbout has made by far the most important contribution to opening up these 
questions (Godbout and Caillé 1998); and in anthropology, similar arguments have been introduced by 
David Graeber (Graeber 2011: chapter 5). 
4
 Perhaps some of the problem is linguistic: Mauss uses the somewhat archaic French term prestation, 
which shares some connotations with the English term loan, rather than cadeau, which would be more 
straightforwardly translatable as gift (Sandy Ross, 2014, personal communication). So he may not intend 
his analysis to apply to all gifts, though he is often read as if he does. 
5
 Although later he shifts towards expressing this as the ‘twofold truth’ of the gift (Bourdieu 2000: 
191). 
6
 While Mauss did recognise that the gift survives in the modern economy, he nevertheless tended to 
see it as a “marginal vestige of what it had once been” (Godbout and Caillé 1998: 11). 
7
 There are of course heterodox economists and sociologists who recognise this point. See, for 
example, Nelson (2005: 18) and Sayer (2004: 9). 
8
 Similarly, Gibson-Graham asks why we should call an economy capitalist “when more hours of 
labour (over the life course of individuals) are spent in noncapitalist activity” (Gibson-Graham 2006: 13). 
9
 The actual return of a good or service, or of money, may be deferred in a market exchange, but there 
is always an immediate binding legal commitment to make a specified return. 
10
 Ashley Mears has documented a modern parallel (2014). By contrast, the kula ring appears to be a 
non-positional form of reciprocal giving (Mauss 2002 [1950]: 27-36). 
11
 For a brilliant account of the role of obligation in giving, see Testart (1998). 
12
 My thanks to the anonymous reviewer whose comments inspired much of this paragraph. 
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